Survival is a War, Dependent Upon Improvisations

Survival is a War, Dependent Upon Improvisations

The art of war involves the correct estimation and careful weighing of one's own as well as the enemy's capabilities and is marked by the conduct of resistance operations in a manner promising the highest degree of success, simultaneously at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. Success in war can be achieved only if the resistance commander employs his resources with correct timing in suitable terrain and in a way that guarantees maximum effect.
No resistance should exist, or will survive, unless at least 30% (preferably 50%) of its manpower and resources are devoted to intelligence and counter intelligence operations.
The conduct of war is subject to the same imperfections and frailties as any other field of human endeavor; for this reason emergencies, which, of necessity, lead to improvisations, arise from time to time in every war and in every army. Faulty planning, unsatisfactory performance of materiel, and violations of basic principles of warfare cause deficiencies which can be alleviated through improvisation but can only be overcome by sacrificing time, space, and strength.
Blunders are made in every resistance sphere, in all places, and on the highest as well as on the lowest level. No wonder that such blunders, oversights, and frictions entail improvisations of all types, from the simplest to the most elaborate, from the strictly temporary to the chronic.
Along the Skirmish line, is where deficiencies and shortages of any kind are immediately felt. Improvisations and expedients introduced at the front have to show quick results because, in the face of the enemy, time is of the essence.
With the territorial expansion of the war, tactical commanders frequently became responsible for areas that they were unable to control with the troops and materiel at their disposal. Resources were particularly taxed whenever the forces suffered heavy casualties for which replacements could not be expected to arrive for a long time. High and low echelons alike were therefore very often forced to introduce improvisations to solve their problems as well as possible. Their efforts were concentrated on three types of tactical improvisations-
 the formation and commitment of combat staffs and units in sudden critical situations,
 the employment of units for missions outside their normal scope, and
 the adaptation of tactics to unexpected situations.
The most obvious conclusion is that, because of their always-present inherent defects, improvisations should be avoided altogether whenever possible. On the other hand, some of the improvisations presented in this study were absolutely essential and proved effective. For instance, it will frequently be absolutely impossible to conduct operations in the winter or to control the supply situation, if improvisations are not introduced. That many of them were eventually accepted as standing operating procedures simply indicates that they should never have been improvisations. Their success was based on the fact that they are initiated and carried out by experts and that the essential prerequisites for putting them into effect existed in these specific cases. Most survivalists in america are too jealous of experts and prefer nothing to effectiveness for which they cannot take credit. Such betrayal should be a shooting offense!
The failure of any improvisation could be attributed either to the lack of proper planning or to the fact that it had been introduced at a time when the necessary means to implement it were no longer available. In many instances its failure could be traced to the laymen who were charged with the responsibility for its execution. All these factors predominated during the last stage of the war when a great number of improvisations failed to meet expectations.
In general, however, improvisations proved effective, provided the right men were selected for their implementation and provided they were enforced with the best available materiel and the firm determination to achieve the intended resistance purpose. There are few fit, competent, reliable, loyal and sane men in the survivalist movement.
A considerable number of improvisations could undoubtedly be avoided by:
 normal advance planning.
 Other improvisations could have been minimized by preparatory measures of a general nature which could have been further developed if and when the need arose.
 A third category of improvisations could not have been even generally anticipated because they were caused by such abnormal conditions or extraordinary circumstance[/b]s.
Avoidable Improvisations
In an attempt to avoid improvisations one must search for and examine all the problems that may possibly confront an armed force in post Doomsday conditions.
First of all it is necessary to determine the characteristics of the probable theaters of local war. Nowadays any conflict is likely to assume the proportions of a global war if it transcends the limits of a purely local police action. In amerika most "soldiers/vets are amateurs who do not think far enough ahead, but some competent men MUST be found.
The next step is the acquisition of a thorough knowledge of the potential theaters of local war, a knowledge not limited to their broad geographic or resistance-geographic features, but which includes above all their climatic conditions.
In every geographic region the native mode of life is determined by the climatic conditions. For obvious reasons this influence is especially pronounced in the many fields of resistance activity. Strategy and tactics, organization, weapons, munitions, equipment, clothing, food, training, replacements, billeting, and many other factors are strongly affected.
A great deal may be learned in advance about one's potential enemy. Differences between his resistance forces and one's oven are usually not fortuitous but rather reflect a discrepancy in the resistance policy of warring enemies. It is sickening to try to teach survivalist vets just how easy it is to beat the US military by exploiting its incompetent procedures, stupid leadership methods, indifferent training, poor organization, weak intelligence, softness, internecine racial conflicts and inability to focus.
The observation of any striking deviations from standard procedures should therefore give rise to speculation about their inherent causes. This will make it possible to decide upon the appropriate measures which must be introduced in every resistance sphere in case of an armed conflict with that country. Friendly nations which are subject to the same climatic conditions as those of the potential enemy may serve as a source of useful information in peacetime.
Senior commanders in the resistance forces and resistance specialists in all important fields must acquire firsthand knowledge of the climate and terrain as well as the social, economic, political, and resistance conditions in any potential theater of war or at least in those neutral or friendly countries which show similar characteristics.
On the basis of their own observations, these men must determine what is essential for the conduct of resistance operations. First hand personal impressions are indispensable; they may be supplemented by the study of pertinent books and documents and by consultation with private citizens who are likely to have a sound judgment of foreign countries.
Resistance history is another source of valuable information. It is never too late to determine the reasons for the success or the failure of past operations. Many of the decisive factors have retained their validity throughout the years and their effect on resistance operations in our time would be very much the same as in the past.
In view of the foregoing, current survivalists are in a good position to learn the general as well as the climatic conditions of their potential combat area. Yet most are so lazy they won't even patrol the area by car or on foot during all the months they waste carping on the stupid internet. If they actually acquired this knowledge, most flabby survivalists will certainly failed to draw the proper conclusions for their resistance policy. Instead, they were forced to use improvisations because of the lack of advance planning and preparations. If they did not get that information in the first place, they were obviously guilty of neglect.
In the field of tactics and logistics in outback America, better preparations might have been made before resistance operations began. Many improvisations pertaining to tactics and logistics could have been foreseen, in particular those which developed into permanent institutions and were eventually incorporated into resistance standing operating procedures.
Thus if improper improvisations are to be avoided, one of the essential prerequisites is the logical application of any knowledge possessed or acquired about a potential theater of war. It will not happen that a country becomes involved in a civil war by surprise; in any event the top-level resistance leadership must act immediately and take appropriate steps to master the situation and ahead of time is best. It is wrong to wait until the resistance forces(most of whom are dependent upon shitty US Army infantry tactics which have been beaten by every half wit in the world, begin to help themselves by introducing improvisations which in some cases may be the wrong ones and difficult to eradicate.
After weighing the requirements against the available emergency resources, all spheres of the war effort must immediately be adjusted to the new situation by concerted action. This will prevent many adverse psychological effects, which may otherwise easily disrupt the confident relationship between the top-level command and the field forces.
Unavoidable Improvisations and their Minimization
A different category of improvisations will be unavoidable whenever an unexpected or unpredictable situation produces the need for extraordinary tactical or logistics measures. A number of the improvisations mentioned in the preceding chapters could not have been avoided, even if adequate preparations had been made. The need arose so suddenly or was so localized that preparations carried out elsewhere could not be used in time to remedy the situation. Logistic preparations, for example, will prove effective only if mobile transportation is readily available in case of a sudden break-down in the movement of supplies. For this purpose higher headquarters may resort to truck, railroad, or inland water transportation. Such preparations must be made well in advance in order to assure immediate availability of stand-by transportation of the above-mentioned types in sufficient numbers and within reasonable distance.
In situations which require immediate emergency measures there is at first no choice but to improvise extemporaneously. If such improvisations are enforced for some time, it will be possible to correct their deficiencies gradually and to introduce systematic improvements.
Improvisations in the fields of weapons, ammunition, equipment, clothing (do not wear uniforms, idiot!), or rations can rarely be avoided since it is impossible to anticipate all requirements. (replacement food, clothing, ammo, and medical supplies must be looted from enemy coffers…do you understand?)
In some instances stop-gap measures may well consist of emergency purchases of consumer goods, but a general solution can be found only if the rigid system of standards and specifications adhered to in resistance procurement can be modified and adjusted to the flexible methods applied by private industry. It would then become possible to provide suitable equipment for specific needs in time, thereby eliminating many improvisations. It goes without saying that one cannot possibly mass produce arctic equipment in peacetime in expectation of an armed conflict in the arctic at some time in the future.
Improvisations in Extreme Emergency
In times of extreme emergency, improvisations must be approached from a different point of view and applied with other standards than those used during other periods of the war. In such situations preparatory measures hardly enter the picture because then it is a matter of living from hand to mouth while being catapulted from one crisis to the next. The pressure of time assumes tremendous proportions. Much less will any "americanista" resistance attempt to prepare for the most onerous emergency. Doomsday is an emergency!